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Abstract
In this paper, we describe a micro-founded simulation environment for decentralized trade in
a nancial asset. Within the philosophy of computer-simulated \articial markets", this envi-
ronment allows one to experiment in a modular fashion with (i) individual characterizations in
terms of behaviors and learning, (ii) dierent architectural and institutional traits of the market,
and (iii) time-embedding of events at the system and the individual level.
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Introduction
In this paper, we describe a micro-founded simulation environment {the Financial \Toy-Room"
(FTR){ for decentralized trade in a nancial asset. Some aspects of the representation are
intentionally kept very simple, and in a sense abstract: quite diverse models may indeed be
implemented as particular instantiations of the general template presented in the following.
The general motivations for FTR are to a good extent akin to those inspiring already existing
computer-simulated \articial markets" of a nancial asset, such as those by Marengo and
Tordjman (1996), Rieck (1994), Beltratti and Margarita (1992), and Arthur et al. (1997).
Obvious common points of departure are (i) the acknowledgment of the limitations of models of
market dynamics centered upon the behavior of a mythical representative agent endowed with
unbiased forward-looking expectations, and conversely (ii) the challenge of nesting the theory
into an explicit account of heterogeneous, interacting agents.
Some forms of heterogeneity in information and beliefs can be incorporated into analytically
tractable models (see for example the information-related heterogeneity in Grossman and Stiglitz,
1976 and 1980, the diversity of beliefs associated to the presence of \noise" traders in De Long
et al. 1990, 1991 and Schleifer and Summers, 1990, see also Blume and Easley, 1990). How-
ever, analytical tractability poses heavy constraints on the forms and degrees of heterogeneity,
as well as the forms of learning, one can handle. Moreover, one is forced to analyze almost
exclusively limit (equilibrium) properties of the models, and neglect nite-time properties which
might nonetheless be the most relevant for comparison with empirical data.
The \articial market" approach tries to overcome these drawbacks by explicitly simulating
populations of interacting agents who might endogenously evolve beliefs, behaviors and \mental
models" (Marengo and Tordjman, 1996): FTR has been build on the grounds of the same basic
philosophy. At the same time FTR, when compared to other \articial markets", enlarges the
scope of analysis in several respects.
First, FTR entails easy experimentation with dierent types of agents, both in terms of behav-
ioral and cognitive patterns, and in terms of learning procedures.
Second, it allows exploration of the properties of dierent architectural and institutional traits,
especially with respect to the \physics" of interactions (e.g. the specic mechanism for decen-
tralized encounters), and the information availability by individual traders {or groups of them.
Third, FTR embodies an explicit time-embedding of events that allows us to easily represent
asynchronous and/or diversely paced \clocks" for diverse classes of events at the system and
individual level (e.g. buying and selling {trading, vs. accessing \news", vs. making trading
decisions, vs. learning). Relatedly, FTR naturally allows us to study the dynamic properties of
the system on dierent time-scales.
As such, we see FTR as the \articial" counterpart of micro-structural studies (cf. Frankel,
Galli and Giovannini, 1997 and Goodhart and Payne, 1996). There is a long and growing
list of \stylized facts" to a good extent still in search of an interpretation (for complementary
discussions, see Brock, 1997, Frankel, Galli and Giovannini, 1997, Goodhart and Figliuoli, 1991,
Guillaume et al. 1997). With FTR, one can investigate what types of cognitive/behavioral
patterns and learning processes, and what types of interaction and information regimes, can
reproduce the regularities detected in empirical markets as emergent properties of the articial
market dynamics.
A second class of exercises, although partly overlapping with the above, have the primary nature
of thought experiments on the eect of individual characterization and institutional set-up upon
system dynamics. Two broad questions come immediately to mind, namely:
1. Holding individual characteristics (i.e. cognitive/behavioral patterns, and possibly learn-
ing processes) and information regime constant, what happens if one changes the interac-
tion regime?
2. Holding the institutional set-up (i.e. interaction and information regimes) constant, what
happens as one varies the \ecology" of cognitive/behavioral patterns and learning pro-
cesses?
In connection with empirical studies, simulation experiments will allow us to assess whether
observed statistical regularities (e.g. the so called \ARCH" eects, \fat tails", etc.) are generic
properties, holding over a wide range of interaction regimes and \ecologies", or conversely,
whether such regularities are conditional to very specic institutional set-ups and distributions
of agents' \types".
Details on the computer implementation of FTR are given in Berte (1998), and some preliminary
simulation experiments are reported in Chiaromonte and Berte (1998).
All through the paper, we stress modularity and comment extensively on how various com-
ponents of the environment can be used, modied or extended while maintaining the general
framework. Section 1 describes the structure of FTR, and the main entities in it. Section 2
describes the dynamics; that is, how the entities and the variables associated with them may
evolve over time. Section 3 provides some illustrative examples of how individual behaviors may
be specied and, together, of alternative trading scenarios. Section 4 concerns the collection of
simulation outputs. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
1 General description
Let us begin with a somewhat loose but intuitive introduction to our articial market and its
basic building-blocks. Our metaphor for the market is a room, inhabited by actual and would-be
traders, and provided with both displays of information on what goes on in the market itself,
and communication lines with the outside world (which represent mechanism of observation of
purportedly \fundamental" and non-fundamental underlying economic variables).
In this metaphor, where in the room traders position themselves maps into micro-decisions {e.g.
seeking or accepting transactions under certain price ranges, remaining inactive, etc.
As already hinted above, the basic philosophy of FTR entails a modular separation of (i) the
\physics" of interactions among traders and the rules by which trade takes place, (ii) the infor-
mation traders might access, (iii) the algorithms by which traders process such information in
making decisions, and eventually the algorithms by which they learn (i.e. evolve their beliefs
and decision-making procedures).
In our metaphor, traders are fully described by their \trading documents", their \note-pads",
and their \manuals".
Trading documents are a sort of \identity card" of the trader at any particular time, reporting
his disposition to, for example, seek/accept a selling/buying transaction (captured by 0-1 ags),
and the prices or price-spreads at which the transaction is sought/acceptable. Moreover, since
traders show each other their documents (or parts of them) upon meeting, these \identity cards"
vector information in pair-wise encounters.
The note-pad contains the \internal-memory" of the trader, recording, for example, the sequence
of transactions he undertook in the past, and information on other traders.
The manual embodies decision and learning algorithms, which of course might range from simple
technical rules to sophisticated calculating abilities.
The board, on one wall of the room, displays all information on market dynamics publicly
available to traders. Moreover, the board displays signals by which traders are called upon
participating in pair-wise encounters, and signals concerning the time-scansion.
Finally, phones stand for access to outside information (i.e. to \news" concerning fundamental,
and possibly non-fundamental, variables). Access can be unlimited, or restricted to a subset of
traders, as well \toll-free" or costly.
Note that the information regime is dened by what is reported on trading documents (or more
specically, what parts of the documents traders are required to show each other upon meeting),
what is placed on the board, and what goes through phone lines (specifying accessibility, and
possibly fees).
Given this overview, let us move to a more detailed description of FTR. For the time being,
we assume the asset to be homogeneous. The room is inhabited by a group of traders T 2 T
engaging in transactions o 2 O. Along the rst wall, there is a row of windows. Along the
second wall, there is a row of chairs. Along the third wall, there is room for by-standers and a
door through which traders enter and leave the room.
A trader's position is expressed via the values of some 0-1 ags (see trading documents below)
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[T ] = 1). Standing by the third wall, a trader renounces involvement. Behind a window, a
trader is in the role of acceptor of transactions. In a chair, he is in the role of seeker. These em-
body two dierent attitudes towards trading that we wish to superimpose to the buying/selling
distinction. As we will see, seekers are designed to be the active parties, and only some particular
traders might be allowed to hold a window and a chair at the same time.
1.1 The board
On the fourth wall, there is a board through which one governs encounters among traders, time
representation, and ows of public information. The board contains a number of \slots", namely:
 Two callers, one for acceptors and one for seekers
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which are used to implement encounters among traders (see below).
 A transaction counter N = card(O) 2 IN
1 1
.
 A clock ticking minutes
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; 
2
; : : : 2 IN
1
system converting sequence. It converts \time in terms of
transactions" into \time in system-minutes". The issue here is how to translate a time pace
dened in terms of transactions into some sort of \objective" time for system-level events
{which are linked to the board clock, as well as some sort of \internal" time for trader-
specic events {which are linked to individual watches (see below). The system converting
sequence allows us, among other things, to represent accelerations and decelerations of the
trading process in system-minutes. In the following, we will often refer to the number of
transactions in a minute as its length-in-transactions
3
.
 A display, reporting (public) information of various kinds:
{ A tape showing all transaction prices p[o] 2 IR
1
+
up to the latest, in the order in which
they occurred, say
p
(1)
; p
(2)
; : : : ; p
(N)
{ A disclosure sheet containing the names and current asset levels of all traders whose
asset endowment exceeds a given threshold
(T; q[T ])2 T  IN
1
; 8T : q[T ]  Q 2 IN
1
1
The reference is to concluded transaction, regardless of whether they have completed yet (see below). card()
indicates the cardinality; that is, the number of elements of the argument set.
2
A sum on an empty set is assumed to be equal to 0.
3
In fact, if the 
j
's are dierent, equal durations in minutes can correspond to dierent lengths-in-transactions
This can be interpreted as an approximate representation of the requirement, typical of
some stock markets, to disclose ownership of an asset (and/or bids for it) when exceeding
a certain level (share). Thus, the threshold Q is an architectural parameter of the market
capturing the extent of publicly available information about the \relative control" on the
asset.
Notice that the board display is the locus for representation and management of public
information ows: Any other publicly available information one might wish to introduce
should be placed here.
1.2 The Phones
Again on the fourth wall, there are phones used by traders to obtain information from outside
the room. In particular, phones convey information on variables aecting (or more generally
related to) the \real" value of the object which the nancial asset denominates. Such variables
are assumed to be independent of the trading process (e.g. dividends on a stock, or other outside
\news"). In the following, we will consider a single variable and simply refer to it as the external
value.
 Through a rst phone number, a trader T can access (a possibly noisy version of) the
current external value
Z
(H)
+ e[T ]
The current external value Z
(H)
2 IR
1
+
evolves exogenously on the minute-scale (following
the board clock). The noise e[T ] is a draw from a probability distribution (usually, but
not necessarily, a 0-mean normal), and might be trader-specic
4
. This could mean that
dierent traders observe independent draws from the same distribution E , or that they
observe independent draws from dierent distributions E [T ]. We also keep the option that
all traders dialing the rst phone number within minute H on the board clock, observe
a singe draw, say e
(H)
, from E
5
. Obviously, the noise can be eliminated by setting the
distribution(s) variance(s) (and possibly mean(s)) to 0
6
.
 Through a second phone number, a trader can access past external values, say
7
Z
(H 1)
; Z
(H 2)
: : :
With this set-up, one might experiment with imperfect and asymmetric information. So, for
example, one can assume that a subgroup of traders has access the history of the external value,
while another subgroup has access to the (noisy) current value. In other words, phone numbers
might not be known to all traders. Moreover, the numbers might be taken to be toll-free, or
fees might be associated to them (i.e. information might be costly, as in Grossman and Stiglitz,
1980).
Phones are the locus for representation and management of external information ows: Any
other information regarding variables independent of the trading process one might wish to
4
Note that this permits the implementation of \noise" traders in the sense of De Long et al. (1991).
5
(Common) draws will still be independent across H's.
6
To better understand the use of e[T ], we refer the reader to Chiaromonte and Berte (1998), and Berte (1998).
7
In practice, the time series will be truncated a certain number of minutes \backwards".
introduce, should go through phone lines for which the experimenter must specify accessibility,
and possibly fees.
The extension to the case of many external values is straightforward; in our metaphor, it is just
a matter of multiplying phone numbers. Traders could observe them alternatively or jointly.
Moreover, one could distinguish between fundamental variables, that are indeed related to the
\real" value of the object denominated by the asset, and sun-spots, that are not related to the
\real" value, but are still observed and used by some traders in their decision-making (more
details are given in Section 3.5).
1.3 Transactions
For the time being and for the sake of simplicity, we assume each transaction to concern only
one unit of the asset. When formalizing decision-making by traders, this allows us to neglect
quantities, and concentrate on prices and completion schedulings (see below). However, this
represents a strong constraint that we plan to remove in the near future. In fact, limiting each
transaction to one unit of asset, besides eliminating a crucial dimension of decision-making,
has other implications due to its \interaction" with other features of FTR: xing the system
converting sequence, i.e. the number of transactions per minute, one xes also the trading
volume per minute
Transactions might or might not be spot. The conclusion of a transaction, i.e. the agreements
on payment and delivery between two traders, might or might not coincide in time with its
completion, i.e. the actual exchange of cash and asset unit.
To handle the time prole we associate to each transaction, together with the minute on the
board clock during which it was concluded, h[o] 2 IN
1
, a completion scheduling
(dh
1
[o]; dh
2
[o]) 2 IN
2
and completion ags
(c
1
[o]; c
2
[o]) 2 f0; 1g
2
h[o] + dh
1
[o] and h[o] + dh
2
[o] express, respectively, the minutes on the board clock for the
payment (from the buyer to the seller) and the delivery (from the seller to the buyer). c
1
[o] or
c
2
[o] equal to 1 express, respectively, the fact that the payment or the delivery have occurred.
We will often refer to transactions which have c
1
[o] and/or c
2
[o] equal to 0 as outstanding.
dh
1
[o] = 0 is meant to represent a spot payment: the buyer b[o] pays p[o] to the seller s[o]
simultaneously to the transaction conclusion, whenever this occurred within h[o]. c
1
[0] will be 1
from the very start. On the other hand, a given dh
1
[o] > 0 bounds b[o] to pay p[o] any time during
minute h[o] + dh
1
[o] on the board clock
8
. At the beginning of h[o] + dh
1
[o]
9
the transaction
enters its completion phase for the buyer, which will terminate when the payment occurs. c
1
[o],
which was initialized at 0 upon conclusion, will then be set to 1. The completion phase is
supposed to last at most one minute, regardless of the length-in-transactions of h[o] + dh
1
[o].
However, we will see that it can be prolonged, even though not indenitely and with a penalty
for the procrastinating trader (see below on bonus-minutes).
8
As we will see, completion is organized in such a way that both payments and deliveries due at certain minute
are performed as soon as possible within that minute; that is, as soon as the involved traders have the necessary
cash or asset units.
9
This coincides with the board transaction counter showing
P
h[o]+dh
1
[o] 1
j=1

j
.
Similarly, dh
2
[o] = 0 represents a spot delivery: the seller s[o] delivers one unit of asset to
the buyer b[o] simultaneously to the transaction conclusion, whenever this occurred within h[o].
c
2
[0] will be 1 from the very start. dh
2
[o] > 0 bounds s[o] to deliver any time during minute
h[o] + dh
2
[o]. At the beginning of h[o] + dh
2
[o] the transaction enters its completion phase for
the seller, which will terminate when the delivery occurs. c
2
[o], which was initialized at 0 upon
conclusion, will then be set to 1 (again, the completion phase ought to last at most one minute
but can be prolonged, even though not indenitely and with a penalty).
It is important to remark that the two scheduling terms dh
1
[o] and dh
2
[o] need not coincide.
Also, the lengths-in-transactions of the two completion phases can dier. While the scheduling
is under traders' control (see below), dierent lengths of the completion phases could be due,
besides traders' procrastination, to dierences in the 
j
's of the (system) converting sequence
{that is, to the fact that some system minutes contain more transactions than others.
Transactions can be classied according to their completion scheduling as: (i) spot-spot (dh
1
[o] =
0, dh
2
[o] = 0), (ii) short on the buying side (dh
1
[o] > 0, dh
2
[o] = 0), (iii) short on the selling
side (dh
1
[o] = 0, dh
2
[o] > 0), and (iv) forward (dh
1
[o] > 0, dh
2
[o] > 0). Thus, the model allows
us to represent spot trading, short buying or selling, and forward trading.
1.4 The Traders
Each trader in the room is characterized by:
 A ag for expulsion (i.e. institutionally sanctioned bankruptcy) ex[T ] 2 f0; 1g. This ag
is initialized at 0; if and when it is switched to 1, the trader is irreversibly removed from
the room.
 A counter of available bonus-minutes B[T ] 2 IN
1
. A certain number B[T ] = B
max
of
bonus-minutes is given to each trader when he enters the room. Those minutes are then
used to extend completion phases of non spot-spot transactions in which the trader is
involved (i.e. to postpone deliveries and/or payments with respect to the agreed upon
scheduling), when needed. B[T ] decreases accordingly.
Note that this bonus-system constitutes an architectural trait of the market (B
max
is an
architectural parameter), which can be interpreted as a lose proxy for a credit system,
which is not explicitly modeled in the current version of FTR
10
(more on the role of
bonus-minutes will be given in Section 2.4).
 Cash and asset endowments; m[T ] 2 IR
1
+
, q[T ] 2 IN
1
.
 An indicator of what we shall call behavioral state r[T ] 2 f1; : : : ; R[T ]g (R[T ] 2 IN
1
), which
captures the kind of algorithms used in decision-making (see description of the manual,
below).
Moreover, the trader carries:
 Trading documents, in the form of an acceptor and a seeker sheet. Each sheet reports two
ags, two reference prices, and two sets of completion scheduling options, respectively for
10
The interpretation is straightforward when bonus-minutes are used to postpone payments, and less immediate,
but similar, when they are used to postpone deliveries {as if traders could borrow from a \bank" asset units, as
well as cash.
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Clearly, the variables in the trading documents constitute the main decision variables for
the trader. In the following, we call positioning the determination of ags, and targeting
the determination of the other components of the trading documents (reference prices and
completion scheduling options).
As we will see, traders are required to show each other their acceptor or seeker sheets (or
parts of them) when encountering. Thus, trading documents convey pair-wise information
exchanges. One might want to introduce some form of censoring (e.g. traders, or some
subgroup of them, might be assumed to disclose their willingness to buy or sell, but
not their reference prices) in order to capture dierent institutional rules on information
disclosure.
Trading documents, possibly with censoring, are the locus for representation and manage-
ment of pair-wise information ows: Any other information that one might want to be
exchanged by traders upon meeting each other should be placed here.
 A watch ticking minutes
H [T ] 2 IN
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for
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X
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[T ]
where 
1
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2
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is T's converting sequence. It converts \time in terms of
transactions" into \time in T -minutes"; that is, into some sort of \internal" time for
trader-specic events {which are linked to individual watches. We use this in representing
traders' decision-making processes, and possibly modication of decision algorithms and
learning.
The watch is not necessarily synchronized with other traders' watches, or with the board
clock, in the sense that the converting sequences might dier. Thus, T 's \internal" watch-
time might be unrelated to that of other traders, and to \objective" board clock-time.
The nature and relations among system and traders' converting sequences can be inter-
preted as both architectural traits of the the market, and behavioral characteristics of
traders. Let us mention a few simple instances: the system sequence could be one of xed
numbers, all equal to each other (all minutes on the board clock have the same length-
in-transactions). Alternatively, the system sequence could be a sequence of independent
draws from a given distribution N on IN
1
. Traders' sequences could just all copy the sys-
tem one 
j
[T ] = 
j
, 8j = 1; 2; : : : , 8T 2 T , or be otherwise xed. Also, traders' sequences
could be themselves sequences of independent draws from distributions N [T ] on IN
1
, and
these distributions could be taken to coincide with N , or be given otherwise.
 A note-pad reporting (private) information of various kinds:
{ A record for each transaction the trader has concluded, with the identities of buyer
and seller (e.g. b[o] = T ), the transaction price, the transaction time, completion
scheduling, and completion ags
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Again, notice that parts of this information might be censored. Moreover, one could
easily introduce a form of time-decay, i.e. progressively remove records relative to
encounters that date more than a given number of minutes backwards.
 A manual containing algorithms which embody the trader's behavioral repertoire. As
already mentioned, the manual is, so to speak, the \brain" wherein rests all behavioral
and latu sensu \cognitive" attributes one gives to the trader. As it stands now, the manual
has two chapters:
{ Chapter 1: Targeting/positioning algorithms. These algorithms are used to update
the variables in the acceptor and seeker sheets, and thereby also the position of the
trader in the room.
{ Chapter 2: Transaction-selection algorithms. These algorithms are used when seeking
transactions, to decide which to conclude among the ones made available by acceptors.
In turn, each chapter contains R[T ] alternative sets of algorithms to be used, respectively,
when the behavioral state is r[T ] = 1, r[T ] = 2, etc. In other words, what we call a
behavioral state can be seen as a collection of behavioral/cognitive patterns relative to
the various tasks addressed by Chapters 1 and 2 of the manual. As we will see in detail
in Section 3, behavioral states can be used in a variety of ways; just to mention some
examples, one r[T ] might correspond to being a fundamentalist, while another r[T ] might
correspond to being a particular type of chartist. Yet another r[T ] might correspond
to specic behavioral patterns followed while trying to cover open positions (i.e. during
completion phases of transactions the trader is involved in).
Within our metaphor, whenever traders can switch between behavioral states, switching
rules could be placed in a third chapter of the manual.
Moreover, a fourth chapter of the manual will eventually preside over the evolution of the
behavioral/cognitive patterns themselves (e.g. through processes of experimentation and
inductive adaptation similar to those modeled by Marengo and Tordjman, 1996, or Arthur
et al. 1997 {see also Section 3.6).
Clearly, Chapters 1 and 2 on one side, and Chapters 3 and 4 on the other, have a dierent
role and nature: the former contain algorithms to trade, while the latter contain \higher
level" algorithms to switch between, or evolve, the previous ones. In the following, we use
the word manual (space of manuals, etc.) to refer to Chapters 1 and 2.
2 The Dynamics
2.1 Concluding transactions: the Trading Round
Let us now describe a standard trading round, which might or might not produce an actual
transaction. As we will see, the trading round specication embodies all rules concerning who
trades with whom, and how.
The seeker caller on the board switches on and shows the name  = T of a trader drawn at
random among the ones waiting in chairs (i.e. such that f

[T ] = 1). T leaves his chair. The
acceptor caller on the board switches on and shows the names  = fT
0
1
; : : : ; T
0
k
g of k traders
drawn at random among the ones behind windows (i.e. such that f

[T
0
] = 1), T itself excluded
(in case he had both ags equal to 1, i.e. was in a chair and at a window simultaneously). These
are the acceptors the seeker has access to. Clearly, seeker and acceptors involved in the round
could be identied with procedures other than (uniform) random drawing.
T approaches all T
0
2  at their windows. In each approach, acceptor and seeker are required
to show each other their acceptor and seeker sheets. Hence, both update the other's record in
their note-pads, with h

(T
0
)[T ] = h

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] = H , the current minute on the board clock. After
having collected the information, T must decide what to do. Suppose f
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Furthermore, if f
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The symbol Un() indicates a uniform probability distribution on the elements of the argument
set, and the draws generating (dh
1
[o]; dh
2
[o]) for each of the available transactions are taken
to be independent. Again, completion schedulings could be determined in ways other than
independent (uniform) random drawing from the set of completion scheduling options that are
common to the traders involved. A form of non-random determination, parameterized through
 2 [0; 1], is given for the price. Also price determination could be implemented in a dierent
fashion.
 2 [0; 1], and (dh
1
[o]; dh
2
[o]) for each available transaction, are supposed to be known to T .
Moreover, the initial completion ags for any of the available transactions would be set to:
c
1
[o] = 1 if dh
1
[o] = 0 ; c
1
[o] = 0 otherwise
c
2
[o] = 1 if dh
2
[o] = 0 ; c
2
[o] = 0 otherwise
If the overall set of available transactions is empty, seeker and acceptor callers on the board
switch o, and the round ends without the conclusion of a transaction.
Suppose now the overall set of available transactions is not empty. Then T selects one among
them using the transaction-selection algorithms in his manual (which might dier depending on
his behavioral state). He goes to the corresponding T
0
, and the two conclude the transaction.
A new o is added to O, the board transaction counter shifts by 1, and the transaction price p[o]
is appended as the latest price on the board display tape.
A record of o is added to T and T
0
note-pads. Moreover, if the transaction is spot on at least one
side, the cash and/or asset levels are updated right away. For example, taking the case b[o] = T :
m[T ] m[T ]  p[o] ; m[T
0
] m[T ] + p[o] if dh
1
[o] = 0
q[T ] q[T ] + 1 ; q[T
0
] q[T ]  1 if dh
2
[o] = 0
In the case of spot delivery, the updated levels of asset of both traders are checked to determine
whether T and/or T
0
must be added to, or removed from, the disclosure sheet in the board
display.
The board clock, as well as the watches of all traders in the room, might or might not shift by
1 (depending on the system and traders' converting sequences). Seeker and acceptor callers on
the board switch o. With both callers switched o, the room is ready to undergo the next
trading round.
k is an architectural parameter of the market: it represents the size of the sample of acceptors
that a seeker has access to in one round. If k = 1 the seeker scans a single acceptor. Hence, he
collects \fresh" information on only one trader, and the transactions available to him might be
none, one, or at most two (one involving him as a buyer, and one involving him as a seller). At
the opposite extreme, if k  card(T
0
2 T : f

[T
0
] = 1) the seeker scans everyone who is willing
to accept transactions (except possibly himself!). Hence, he collects \fresh" information on all
acceptors, and can choose among all potential transaction partners. The interpretation in terms
of degrees of \informational perfection" and \globality" of interactions is straightforward.
The procedure to identify seeker and acceptors involved in the round constitutes an architec-
tural trait of the market. Instead of (uniform) random drawing, one could attribute dierent
probabilities to dierent traders. Seekers could be given dierent probabilities based on their
behavioral state (e.g. one state might entail a higher probability than other states). Once a
seeker has been identied (that is, conditionally), acceptors could be given dierent probabil-
ities based on how their behavioral state matches the one of the seeker (e.g. having the same
behavioral state, or a state dened as complementary to the one of the seeker, might entail a
higher probability than other states). For example, noise traders, or particular types of them,
might be made more likely to meet other noise traders.
Alternatively, acceptors might be given dierent (conditional) probabilities based on some mea-
sures of \closeness" to the seeker, in ways not related to behavioral states. These measures
could be proxies for diverse aspects, ranging from sheer size (and hence \visibility") of the ac-
ceptor, to spatial closeness, to \institutional" closeness. Finally, one could eventually model
mechanisms of reputation and market loyalty, so that with high probability a seeker samples
acceptors that have a good \public" reputation and/or with whom he has successfully dealt in
the past. This requires the introduction of information on traders' failures (see remarks at the
end of Section 2.4).
In general, 1  k << card(T
0
2 T : f

[T
0
] = 1) forces trading interactions to be non-global, to
an extent measured by k=card(T
0
2 T : f

[T
0
] = 1). If, in the two-stage procedure, acceptors
selection (second stage) depends on the seeker (rst stage), non-globality can be interpreted as
locality in terms of some measure of \closeness".
Also  is an architectural parameter: it expresses the relative degree of \power" of seeker and
acceptor in forming the price of a transaction. If  = 1, the transaction price will coincide
with the seeker's reference price, while if  = 0 it will coincide with the acceptor's reference
price. The procedure to determine prices, as well as that to determine completion schedulings,
are architectural traits of the market, too. As we mentioned already, the experimenter could
specify them in a dierent fashion. In particular, combining them with asymmetric and possibly
diversied censoring of trading documents (i.e. what is disclosed upon meeting depends on the
trader's role in the encounter, and possibly on the type of trader), one could attempt to model
\order-driven" markets as distinguished from \price-driven" markets as the ones described here
(for a discussion of dierent market types, see Tordjman, 1998).
2.2 Completing transactions
When the board transaction counter shows N , there is a (possibly empty) set of outstanding
transactions which are in completion phase for the buyer
h[o]+dh
1
[o] 1
X
j=1

j
 N ; c
1
[o] = 0
and/or for the seller
h[o]+dh
2
[o] 1
X
j=1

j
 N ; c
2
[o] = 0
Correspondingly, payments and deliveries occur up to the current cash and asset availability
of the traders involved, according to a pseudo-simultaneous procedure. By pseudo-simultaneity
we mean, loosely speaking, that failure in some of the scheduled payments (deliveries) depends
solely on actual cash (asset) shortages on the side of the traders involved, and not on the ordering
in which payments (deliveries) are performed
11
.
At the end of the procedure, all traders involved will have new levels of cash and asset, and
updated completion ags for transactions in their note-pads. Transactions that have been com-
pleted on both sides become inactive. Nevertheless, they are not removed from O, and their
records are not removed from traders' note-pads. In fact, the information in them might still
be useful. One could interpret this by saying that transaction history is fully retained in the
system. Of course, a dissipation mechanism could be contemplated at the system level and/or
within traders' note-pads: a certain number of minutes after conclusion on both sides, one could
remove transactions from the system, their prices from the board tape, and their records from
traders' note-pads.
Last, the new levels of asset of traders making or receiving deliveries are checked to determine
who must be added to, or removed from, the disclosure sheet in the board display.
11
Here is an example: two payments are outstanding at the same moment: T has 10 dollars in his pocket, and
owes 5 to T
0
; T
0
has 2 dollars in his pocket, and owes 4 to T
00
. If the rst payment is considered rst, then both
payments will be performed. On the other hand, if the second payment is considered rst, it will fail although
T
0
can actually count on 5 + 2 = 7 > 4 dollars. In order to make the procedure pseudo-simultaneous, one must
nd an ordering of outstanding payments (deliveries) which avoids situations like the one described above. We
devised an algorithm for doing this, which is described in detail in Berte (1998).
2.3 Updating the trading documents: Targeting/Positioning
When the board transaction counter shows N , there is a set of traders that:
 have just concluded a transaction, and/or
 are at the end of a minute on their watches
H[T ]
X
j=1

j
[T ] = N
The set is certainly not empty, as it always contains at least the seeker and the acceptor who
have concluded the transaction bringing the board transaction counter from N   1 to N . What
is important to notice is that other traders (who have not just concluded a transaction) might
be in the set as well because of time passing by on their watches.
Each trader in this set updates his acceptor and seeker sheets (targeting), and consequently
repositions himself in the room. He does so using the targeting/positioning algorithms in his
manual (which might dier depending on his behavioral state).
2.4 Expulsion: leaving the room
Suppose T is the buyer in a given transaction o (b[o] = T ). If he has not performed his payment
p[o] by the end of minute h[o] + dh
1
[o]
12
, he is allowed to extend the (buyer) completion phase
by one minute using one bonus. Similarly, T can extend the (seller) completion phase of a
transaction in which s[o] = T . Bonus-minutes can be used in sequence and in parallel; that is,
to extend the completion phase of one transaction several times, and/or the completion phases
of several transactions simultaneously.
At the end of each minute H on the board clock
13
, each trader will request a certain number
of bonuses, say dB[T ]  0, to extend completion phases to the next minute. If B[T ]  dB[T ],
the bonus-minutes are awarded and used. The counter is updated correspondingly: B[T ]  
B[T ] dB[T ]. On the other hand, if B[T ] < dB[T ], the bonus-minutes are not awarded and the
trader's expulsion ag ex[T ] is switched from 0 to 1.
All concluded transactions involving T for which neither payments nor deliveries have occurred
yet (both completion ags = 0), are simply \canceled". Technically, their completion ags
are switched to 1 in traders' note-pads as if they had been completed, although payments and
deliveries associated to them will never be performed. A sort of bankruptcy procedure is then
implemented.
Suppose ex[T ] = 1 following a failed payment in the amount of p[o]. T still might have 0 <
m[T ] < p[o] in cash, and q[T ] > 0 in asset units. Conversely, if ex[T ] = 1 following a failed
delivery, T still might have m[T ] > 0 in cash, and will necessarily have q[T ] = 0
14
. Residual
cash and asset units, if any, will be distributed to complete transactions concluded by T for
which the other trader has already performed his payment or delivery (T 's side completion ag
= 0, while the other completion ag = 1). With his residual q[T ], T can cover deliveries for
12
This coincides with the board transaction counter showing
P
h[o]+dh
1
[o]
j=1

j
.
13
This corresponds to the board transaction counter showing
P
H
j=1

j
.
14
This is because the failed delivery is bound to concern one unit of asset.
payments he has already received, or give back units he has already taken but not yet payed
for. Similarly, with his m[T ], T can cover payments for deliveries he has already received, or
give back cash he has already taken but not yet delivered for.
Regarding the asset, one can perform up to q[T ] deliveries/units restitutions, and we use a
chronological ordering based on completion scheduling. Regarding cash, one can perform one
or more payments/cash restitutions whose global amount does not exceed m[T ], and we use an
increasing price order
15
.
Likewise a regular completion round, the bankruptcy procedure modies the levels of cash and
asset of the traders involved, including the one under bankruptcy. T 's side completion ags
for the transactions that are covered through the bankruptcy procedure are switched to 1 in
the traders' note-pads. Finally, transactions already concluded by the other party which did
not get covered on T 's side through the bankruptcy procedure are \canceled" as well (T 's side
completion ag is switched to 1), with a net loss (as usual, inactive transactions are not removed
from O, and their records are not removed from traders' note-pads).
T is then removed from T ; he leaves the room (through the \door") irreversibly. Unlike records
relative to completed (inactive) transactions, records relative to expelled (irreversibly inactive)
traders are removed from other traders' note-pads.
A delicate issue is that of a trader's residual asset and/or cash endowments (if any) upon expul-
sion. In fact, even after the bankruptcy procedure, T might have m[T ] and/or q[T ] > 0. Letting
T walk out of the room with them, i.e. eliminating the remaining endowments, would create
outows of cash and/or asset units from the room. Cash outows are conceivable, but units
outows might be troubling. In particular, this is the case whenever FTR is used to represent
trading in a stock, whose overall number of units (shares) ought to remain constant
16
. An easy
solution to the problem is to pool the residual units of expelled traders into a \fund" from which
traders entering the room draw their initial asset endowments (see below).
Another remark is in order here. Suppose only some particular traders were allowed behind
windows. Then, the expulsion of all such traders would automatically annihilate the whole
trading system, as no one could accept transactions anymore. Similarly, in the case in which
only some particular traders were allowed in chairs, the system would collapse for lack of seekers
if all those trader were expelled. The \irreversible" collapse of a market is a rare but possible
event, which could be produced by FTR though this route. Relatedly, \non-irreversible" market
collapses could be produced if all traders allowed behind windows (in chairs) chose to stand by
the third wall (i.e. to temporarily renounce involvement).
The initial number of bonus-minutes B
max
2 IN
1
is another architectural parameter of the
market. Large values of B
max
increase the likelihood that concluded transactions will eventually
be completed, and decrease the likelihood of traders eventually being expelled from the room.
On the other hand, large values of B
max
allow for substantial departures from the agreed upon
completion schedulings, weakening the role of the latter as both a \decision variable" and a
\disciplining device".
15
This maximizes the number of payments/cash restitutions one covers, but is an arbitrary choice. Other
orderings could be implemented by the experimenter: for example, a decreasing price order would give priority
to larger payments/cash restitutions. Of course, a further alternative would be a random order: payments/cash
restitutions would be listed in random order, and scanned until one (if any) is found which does not exceed m[T ];
this item would be covered and eliminated from the list, and m[T ] would be reduced accordingly. The scanning
would resume until a payment/cash restitution is found (if any) which does not exceed the new m[T ], etc.
16
Unless, in further developments, one attempts to model share issues, buy-backs, etc.
Notice that, for the time being, we do not maintain information relative to traders' failures
anywhere in the system. The rationale is that the market is one in which honoring of agreements
is institutionally enforced through an expulsion penalty (which is stronger the smaller B
max
).
Moreover, as we will see in Section 3.1, traders can be assumed to be fully aware of this, and to
behave accordingly. Thus, a memory of \bankruptcy reputation" is unnecessary.
Obviously, one might want to modify this: information relative to traders' failures could be
introduced at several levels. Identities and B[T ]'s of all traders, or of all traders whose number
of available bonus minutes is below a certain threshold, could be posted on the board disclosure
sheet and updated in \real-time"; in this case, the information would be complete, never obsolete,
and public. Alternatively, traders might be required to report their B[T ]'s on their acceptor
and seeker sheet (and not to censor it); in this case, the information would be complete, but
passed and registered in note-pads only upon pair-wise encounters. In both cases, the ows of
information relative to available bonus-minutes is institutionally regulated via the board or the
trading documents. The second scenario limits ows to pair-wise encounters: to know about T
0
,
T must meet him. Moreover, the information T keeps in store will be relative to the time in which
the last encounter took place, and thus subject to obsolescence (until T meets T
0
again). Last,
one might add a slot to a trader's note-pad records of other traders. Besides trading documents,
T might keep counts of delay-minutes on payments and deliveries inicted on T himself by each
T
0
he has dealt with. In this case, the ows of information are not institutionally regulated; they
can obviously be obsolete, and are incomplete, as T will count only those delays that aected
him directly
17
.
If information on traders' failures is introduced in any of the above ways, it could obviously be
used in decision-making processes, i.e. become one of the inputs of the positioning/targeting
and transaction-selection algorithms. Besides selection among transactions made available by
sampled acceptors, information on traders' failures could also be used to orient the seeker's
sampling of acceptors in a trading round.
Finally, note that with some easy additions to the current version of FTR, some traders (i.e.
\market makers") could be allowed to access outside credit (at least up to a ceiling) rather than
use bonus-minutes. Relatedly, those traders would perform as a sort of \clearing house" for the
market.
2.5 Entering the room
Expulsion constitutes a natural death process for the system. A birth process could be introduced
as well
18
. Through births one can represent inow of new investors, and appearance of new
types of traders; that is, of traders characterized by novel behavioral and cognitive patterns. As
death by expulsion, birth could be anchored to the board (transaction-based) clock by admitting
traders into the room at the beginning of each minute.
17
A further alternative would be to have information on B[T ]'s pass through costly phone lines. This hints to
a whole other class of information ows that could be introduced in the model; that is, information regarding the
trading process which can be accessed possibly by a subgroup of traders, and possibly at a cost. We have taken
phones as a metaphor for information from \outside the room", but one could introduce a second row of phones
conveying information from \inside the room" to traders who know the required phone numbers {access codes{,
with a given fee. See the discussion in Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990).
18
Technically, the set O is augmented by transaction conclusion. Transactions become then inactive over time
as they get completed, but as we have seen they are never removed from O. A birth process augments T : traders
become then inactive over time if and only if they are expelled, and as we have seen they are removed from from
T .
When generating new traders, the experimenter has to decide, among other things, how to
initialize their cash and asset endowments, and their manuals (i.e. cognitive and behavioral
patterns). Cash and asset endowments of entrants create inows of cash and units in the room.
Entry can be formalized as a two-stage random procedure. At the beginning of a minute, the
number of entrants n
E(H)
is drawn from a distribution N
E
on IN
1
. Draws are independent
across minutes. Of course, one could endogenize N
E
. For instance, one could allow the number
of entrants to depend, in probability, on past average returns on the market.
The units in the \fund" obtained by pooling residual asset endowments of expelled traders, if any,
are evenly distributed among new entrants. Then, cash levels and manuals are initialized. This
is done through n
E(H)
independent draws from a distribution, say I
(H)
, on IR
1
+
 the (current)
\space of manuals". Clearly, the nature of the latter will depend on how the algorithms in the
manual are formalized, and might be quite complex.
One way of specifying I
(H)
which works regardless of the nature of the space of manuals, is
cloning; that is, drawing at random from a weighted group of traders (i.e. allowing for dierent
probabilities for the various members), and attributing to the entrant under consideration the
cash level and manual of the selected trader. Obviously, one can use a noisy version of cloning,
superimposing an (independent) error to the cash level and manual of the trader being cloned.
This brings back issues related to the nature of the space of manuals, though, as one must dene
an error on such space
19
.
Also, one has to specify the group of traders from which to draw. For some experiments, one
might want to use the group of incumbents (i.e. the traders already in the room at the end
of H   1) weighted by wealth (say m[T ] + p
(N)
q[T ], where cash and asset levels are the ones
immediately after N =
P
H 1
j=1

j
  1 {the last transaction of minute H   1). Of course, other
measurements of performance (e.g. realized returns) over a certain historical record might be
used to weight traders.
Some words cautions are in oder: weighting incumbents by wealth or other performance mea-
surements, one makes the implicit assumption that the latter are known to potential entrants
who, although with a random element at play, target the most \successful" incumbents. More-
over, attributing to a new entrant the manual of an incumbent, even with an error superimposed
to it, one implicitly assumes that there is very little appropriability to the behavioral and cogni-
tive patterns embodied in manuals. This becomes critical when incumbents are allowed to learn,
i.e. to evolve such patterns. Similar considerations apply for cash endowments: one makes the
implicit assumption that the new entrant will be capable of starting out at the same cash-size
of the cloned incumbent, possibly with a noise.
For other experiments, one might want to use the group of incumbents, with weights specied
in terms of types of traders. When cloning, such weights are proxies for the tacitness and
appropriability of the behavioral/cognitive patterns characterizing each incumbent type (high
weights corresponding to low tacitness and appropriability).
In some cases, one can construct an ad-hoc weighted group of pseudo-traders from which to
draw. This will give manuals and cash endowments distributions for entrants, tailored to the
experiment. In particular, this is the way to go when using entry to experiment with immission
of specic new types of traders in the system (weights will correspond to probabilities for each
19
For example, one might copy strings expressing algorithms, with non-zero probability of mistakes in various
positions along the strings themselves. This would be a sort of population-version of the exploration process
modeled at the individual level by Marengo and Tordjman (1996).
new type).
In full generality, entry allows experiments on the invadibility of particular \ecologies" of behav-
ioral/cognitive patterns, with their population-level dynamics of replication, by novel patterns
that enter the market along its unfolding history.
2.6 The \external value(s)"
As already mentioned, we assume the existence of one (or more) external variable(s) aecting the
the \real" value of the object which the nancial asset denominates (i.e. so called fundamentals).
We considered one such variable, labeled \external value", for simplicity, and assumed it to evolve
on the minute-scale following the board clock. How one species the exogenous evolution of Z
(H)
is obviously crucial to simulation experiments whenever a non-negligible number of traders uses
information from the phones. As a rst approximation we set, at the beginning of each minute
H
Z
(H)
= z
(H)
+ 
(H)
where z
(H)
is a systematic component, and the 
(j)
, j = 1; 2; : : : are independent draws from
a probability distribution Z (usually, but not necessarily, a 0-mean normal). Obviously the
variance can be set to 0, reducing Z
(H)
to coincide with the systematic component.
Notice that we are allowing for two levels of randomness relative to the external value: First,
Z
(H)
can itself contain a uctuation about the systematic component. Second, traders who access
the external return might superimpose to the uctuation an independent reading error (e[T ]).
Keeping these two levels of randomness separate increases the exibility of FTR in representing
various scenarios.
A dynamics must be specied for z
(H)
: in certain settings one might want to keep z
(H)
constant,
but any non-constant exogenous \trend" can be implemented. Moreover, one can implement a
random walk using an endogenous formulation for the systematic component: z
(H)
= Z
(H 1)
20
.
A non-0-mean for the i.i.d. steps 
(j)
, j = 1; 2; : : : would then represent a drift.
In the experiments described in Chiaromonte and Berte (1998), z
(H)
is constant, var(
(H)
) = 0,
and traders have non-zero variance reading errors.
3 Behavioral repertoires and market features
The algorithms in a trader's manual can use as input any variable on the board, from the
phones, or \internal" to the trader himself. In particular, they can use (public) information from
the board display, any (outside) information obtained through the phones, and any (private)
information recorded in the trader's note-pad. In full generality, we only assume the targeting
algorithms to be such that
p

b
[T ]  p

s
[T ] ; p

b
[T ]  p

s
[T ]
This is a consistency requirement on the mechanism forming reference prices (see trading doc-
uments in Section 1).
20
Rigorously, this means setting Z
(H)
jZ
(H 1)
 Z
(H 1)
+ 
(H)
. Notice one has to specify a initial value or
distribution for Z
(0)
.
It is important to stress that the model can host any kind of behavioral heterogeneity. Multiple
behavioral/cognitive patterns coexisting within the \brain" (i.e. the manual) of a single traders
(as for example in Marengo and Tordjman, 1996) can be represented by diversifying algorithms
across states r[T ]. Behavioral and cognitive diversity among traders can be represented by
diversifying algorithms in corresponding states, or introducing dierent states, across traders.
In all cases, heterogeneity can be simply in terms of parameter values, or extend to form and
nature of the algorithms themselves.
While some of the algorithms embody the cognitive/behavioral repertoire that traders are \free"
to chose and evolve, other algorithms might embody internal representations of the rules which
particular institutional architectures impose upon \orderly" trading behavior. Let us consider
a few examples.
3.1 The honoring constraint
The market is one in which agreements are supposed to be honored. As we have seen, traders
who fail to complete transactions they concluded according to their scheduling are subject to
strong penalties (expulsion after B
max
bonus-minutes). We assume traders to be aware of this,
and behave accordingly. We have also discussed a corollary to this assumption: since missed
completion ought to be an exception, information on traders' failures is not maintained anywhere
in FTR (and is not used in traders' decision-making).
Still, completion of outstanding transactions might not be the main factor determining traders'
decisions when actual exchange events are not on the immediate horizon. In order to capture
this, we assume all traders to have R[T ]  2 behavioral states, the rst of which is labeled red-
alert. This state implies the use of targeting/positioning and transaction-selection algorithms
particularly aimed at collecting the cash and asset units necessary to complete outstanding
transactions. We then take a trader to be in red-alert (r[T ] = 1) if and only if he is in completion
phase (as a buyer and/or a seller) for at least one of his outstanding transactions.
If red-alert algorithms are eective, and minutes (on the board clock) long enough on average
in terms of transactions, traders ought to be able to complete almost all the transactions they
concluded according to their scheduling.
Notice that we link the red-alert state to having transactions in completion phase, and not
to knowing that B[T ] is approaching 0. In other words, we assume traders not to willingly
take advantage of the existence of bonus-minutes. This can be considered a conservative (and
possibly sub-optimal) behavior if traders are aware of the existence of the bonuses, and know
the exact value of B
max
. On the other hand, it can be easily interpreted as a reasonable (if not
mathematically optimal) rule, if traders attribute a large enough dis-utility to being irreversibly
expelled from the room. Finally, it can be taken as an institutionally shaped \ethical" trait.
3.2 Synchronous vs asynchronous completion markets
The market might be one in which trading goes on without interruption. In this case it would not
make sense to constrain the completion phases of non-spot-spot transactions to some particular
time intervals. On the other hand, the market might be one in which trading is divided into
discrete periods, say days, and payments and deliveries associated to transactions concluded
during one day are supposed to take place within the day itself. This bounds all transactions
concluded during the last minute of each day to be spot-spot. Once more, we assume the traders
to be aware of this, and to behave accordingly.
Going one step further, we can then assume that in such a setting traders will schedule all ex-
changes that are not spot to occur during the last minute. Thus, the completion phases (for both
buyers and sellers) of all non-spot-spot transactions concluded during a given day will concen-
trate in the last minute of the day itself. Correspondingly, traders will be in red-alert only then,
if ever. This further divides each trading day into what we could call a speculation or arbitrage
period (all minutes before the last), and a completion rush (the last minute) characterized by
spot-spot trading.
This description is accurate with the exception of traders extending completion phases through
bonus-minutes: delayed payments and deliveries will carry over to the rst minute(s) of the
following trading day. Hence, what we named the speculation period of a day could still see
some completion phases and some traders in red-alert. If red-alert algorithms are reasonably
eective, last minutes are long enough on average in terms of transactions, and traders are
not given too many bonus-minutes, one should still notice a fairly clear overall dierentiation
between trading all along the day, and trading in the last minute. If not, one might actually
have a three-period day with a completion rush in the initial minute(s), a speculation phase,
and the nal completion rush {whose \tails" generate completion rush in the initial minute(s)
of the following day, etc.
In symbols, take H

2 IN
1
n f0g to be the length in minutes of a trading day (which is assumed
to be the same for all days). The targeting/positioning algorithms of each T will be required to
be such that
D

b
[T ]; D

s
[T ]; D

b
[T ]; D

s
[T ]  f(0; mH

 H)g  f(0; mH

 H)g
under all behavioral states. H is as usual the current minute on the board clock, andm = 1; 2; : : :
is a day counter.
3.3 Imitation
An interesting issue concerns the representation of imitation phenomena. Imitation is con-
strained by what traders know about each other through the board disclosure sheet, and the
records they keep in their note-pads. Still, even without introducing any further information
items in these loci, the targeting/positioning algorithms of a trader T could use as input the
information on size from the board display, combined with what he can infer on other traders'
targeting from the records he maintains of their acceptor and seeker sheets. Let us make a
simple example: T could take up the ags and the reference prices of T
0
as they were the last
time the two met (or more generally use them in his updatings), if he knows from the mandatory
public disclosure that q[T
0
] has exceeded a given level [T ]( Q), and the meeting occured less
than [T ] minutes ago. In essence, this pattern embodies something like: \if you have recent
information on what George Soros did, do the same" (or more generally, behave accordingly).
A certain number of traders in the room could then be characterized by this imitative targeting
behavior (possibly with dierent parameters [T ] and [T ]) whenever not in red-alert. More
generally, a behavioral state (say r[T ] = 2) implying such behavior could be introduced for all
traders, together with conditions under which the state is entered and exited.
3.4 (Functional) dierentiation of traders
One could also qualify traders' algorithms, and hence use what we label behavioral states,
to dene dierent roles in the trading process. We may call investor a trader whose target-
ing/positioning algorithms are such that
f

b
[T ] = f

s
[T ] = 0 and therefore f

[T ] = 0
all along. An investor is a trader who is not allowed behind windows, is aware of it, and behaves
accordingly. On the other hand, we may call market maker a trader whose targeting/positioning
algorithms allow for the acceptor-side ags to be equal to 1. A market maker will sometimes,
or even always, be behind a window.
Notice that investors, who metaphorically correspond to \real-economy" operators (e.g. individ-
ual savers, commodity-producing rms, etc.), will never be in two places simultaneously. Only
market makers, who metaphorically correspond to nancial operators, can be at a window and
in a chair at the same time.
Targeting/positioning algorithms, as well as selection ones, will be further dierentiated to
embody dierences in aims and approaches to trade between the two types of traders.
Once more, a certain number of traders in the room could then be characterized as market
makers, and the remaining as investors. Notice that, as investors can only be seekers, while
market makers can be both seekers and acceptors, a necessary condition for the system to
function is the existence of at least one market maker.
3.5 A tentative behavioral taxonomy for spot-spot trading based on \price
assessment"
Assume that traders limit themselves to transactions that are spot on both sides. Whenever
updating, they set (completion scheduling options)
D

b
[T ] = D

s
[T ] = D

b
[T ] = D

s
[T ] = f(0; 0)g
and targeting/positioning, as well as transaction-selection (by seekers), concern only ags and
reference prices.
Since completion scheduling (and thus, possible information on traders' failures) plays no role,
we attribute to all traders {who do seek{ a transaction-selection algorithm based on mere price
ranking among available transactions in a trading round
21
.
As far as targeting/positioning is concerned, ags and/or reference prices are assumed to be set
in relation to some \peg", which implicitly embodies the expectations of the trader on the value
of the asset. For example, \fundamentalists" will form their peg based on information on the
fundamental variable(s), while \chartists" will attempt to detect a structure in the past price
dynamics, etc. We call the peg a price assessment. In symbols, let
G

(x
o
; x) = maxf 0 ; x
o
+ g

(x  x
o
) g
be a function from IR
2
+
to IR
1
+
parameterized through a a vector . g

() is from IR
1
to IR
1
; in
particular, we will consider
g

(y) = 
1
y Ind(jyj  
2
)
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Notice that ranking reference prices of acceptors or transaction prices is equivalent, as the latter are just
convex combinations (with the same ) between the former and the seeker's reference prices.
where Ind() is the indicator function of the argument condition, 
1
2 IR
1
and 
2
2 IR
1
+
. This
represents a linear form which is at at 0 in a neighborhood of 0 of radius 
2
, and has slope 
1
outside it.
All traders use G

(; ) to form their price assessment. x
o
can be interpreted as a center: within
a 
2
-neighborhood of x
o
, there's no reactivity to the dierence x  x
o
, and the price assessment
is set at the center itself, while outside the neighborhood, one has a linear reaction whose sign
and size are expressed by the sign and size of 
1
.
Also, all traders update ags and reference prices based on their price assessment. However, we
dierentiate traders in three respects, namely
 what variables x
o
; x enter the computation of the price assessment (what information is
used)
 how the price assessment components x
o
and g

(x   x
o
) are employed in updating ags
and reference prices (how such information is used for targeting/positioning)
 the values of the parameters for the price assessment computation (
1
[T ]; 
2
[T ]), and of
any parameters for the updating of ags and reference prices (see below)
In terms of variables entering the price assessment computation, one could list at least
ve possibilities:
1. A (strong) fundamentalist trader with access to a noisy version of the current external
value. For instance, assume that the asset is a stock. Further, for simplicity of exposition,
suppose that the external value Z
(H)
is not the return of the related rm in H , but already
the \equilibrium" capitalization (whatever that might mean...) of the whole ow of present
and future returns. The fundamentalist will simply take Z
(H)
+ e[T ] as price assessment.
This corresponds to setting
x
o
= x = Z
(H)
+ e[T ]
Clearly g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) = 0, so the parameters 
1
[T ]; 
2
[T ] are irrelevant in this case.
2. A (quasi) fundamentalist trader with access only to the history of external values, who
extrapolates the current external value with a moving average, and then computes his
price assessment setting
x
o
= Z
(H 1)
; x =
X
j=0;1;:::

j
[T ]Z
(H 1 j)
(the parameters 
j
[T ] are non-negative weights adding up to 1).
3. An adaptive trader or chartist (see Brock et al. 1992), looking at the time series of
prices (which is public information, up to the very last transaction), who extrapolates the
next transaction price with a moving average, and then computes his price assessment
setting
x
o
= p
(N)
; x =
X
j=0;1;:::
 
j
[T ]p
(N j)
(the parameters  
j
[T ] are non-negative weights adding up to 1).
4. As a special case when  
0
[T ] = 1,  
j
[T ] = 0; j 6= 0, we obtain a noise trader (see
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) that, somewhat like the fundamentalist in (1) with respect
to Z
(H)
+ e[T ], simply takes as price assessment the last transaction price p
(N)
:
x
o
= x = p
(N)
Again g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) = 0, so that 
1
[T ]; 
2
[T ] are irrelevant.
5. A sun-spotter who, in the simplest version, takes as price assessment a random variable
V completely unrelated to both trade and the \real" value of the object denominated by the
asset. This corresponds to setting
x
o
= x = V
Once more g
[T ]
(x   x
o
) = 0, so that 
1
[T ]; 
2
[T ] are irrelevant. In a somewhat dierent
version, a sun-spotter could use the current price as center, and react to a random variable
W (unrelated to trade and \real" value) through the g

-formulation
22
:
x
o
= p
(N)
; x = W
6. An imitator who chooses another trader T
0
as target (based for example on size informa-
tion from the board disclosure sheet, and information on last encounters from his records),
and then computes his price assessment setting
x
o
= p
(N)
; x = p^
()
()
(T
0
)[T ]
Needless to say, one might dene, and experiment with, traders characterized by much more
sophisticated inferential procedures (they could be skilled econometricians, use neural nets, etc.).
In terms of how the price assessment components are employed in updating ags and
reference prices, consider as illustration the following examples:
1. A \Take-Action" trader who updates his seeker ags on the basis of g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) as:
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) > 0 =) f

b
[T ] = 1 ; f

s
[T ] = 0 seek to buy
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) = 0 =) f

b
[T ] = 0 ; f

s
[T ] = 0 hold
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) < 0 =) f

b
[T ] = 0 ; f

s
[T ] = Ind(q[T ]  1) seek to sell
Notice that whether buying (selling) is associated to a positive (negative) x   x
o
or vice-
versa, depends on the sign of 
1
[T ]; both links can be considered and represented. The
indicator function in the last line makes seeking to sell conditional to having at least one
asset unit in store
23
.
Seeking reference prices, on the other hand, do not depend on the trader's price assessment:
he will pursue the action he selected to the limits of his current cash endowment
24
setting
p

b
[T ] = m[T ] ; p

s
[T ] = 0
so if f

b
[T ] = 1, T is willing to buy at any price within his budget constraint, while if
f

s
[T ] = 1, he is willing to sell no matter how low the price. Since Take-Action embodies
22
one could take for example W  N(p
(N)
; 
2
), so that (x  x
o
)  N(0; 
2
).
23
Recall trading is spot-spot, so deliveries cannot be postponed.
24
Likewise deliveries, payments cannot be postponed.
such an extreme approach, we conne it to seeking and assume a Take-Action trader never
to be an acceptor
25
:
f

b
[T ] = 0 ; f

s
[T ] = 0
Consequently, acceptor reference prices are irrelevant.
2. A \Form-a-Spread" trader is always available to exchange, within the limits of his asset
endowment, and of a share of his cash endowment. Moreover, he can both seek and accept
transactions, and does not diversify his ags and reference prices in the two roles. Thus,
he sets
f

b
[T ] = f

b
[T ] = 1 ; f

s
[T ] = f

s
[T ] = Ind(q[T ]  1)
The price assessment components x
o
and g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) are used to form reference prices,
as to dene a spread. The calculation involves both a spread parameter "[T ] 2 IR
1
+
, and a
caution parameter [T ] 2 [0; 1]:
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) > 0 =) p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] = minfx
o
; [T ]m[T ]g
p

s
[T ] = p

s
[T ] = x
o
+ 2"[T ]
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) = 0 =) p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] = minfx
o
  "[T ]; [T ]m[T ]g
p

s
[T ] = p

s
[T ] = x
o
+ "[T ]
g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) < 0 =) p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] = minfx
o
  2"[T ]; [T ]m[T ]g
p

s
[T ] = p

s
[T ] = x
o
Again, the sign implications depend on the sign of 
1
[T ]. This can be interpreted as follows:
T considers his price assessment x
o
+ g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) as relative to some generic future, but
not entirely reliable as a point-evaluation. Thus, he does not use x
o
+g
[T ]
(x x
o
) to form
reference prices for the very next transaction he will engage in. Instead, T uses the sign
of g
[T ]
(x  x
o
), which he trusts to be reliable, to orient upwards or downwards a spread
anchored to the center x
o
.
Note that in all cases in which one sets x
o
= x (e.g. the rst type of fundamentalist and
the noise trader in the previous classication), the price assessment reduces to x
o
and the
spread is always symmetric about it. The spread can then be interpreted as some sort of
interval-evaluation, and "[T ] as a measure of the uncertainty the trader attributes to the
price assessment pivoting it (see Chiaromonte and Berte, 1998).
Relatedly, note also that the experimenter could turn "[T ] into an endogenous variable
26
.
In analogy to what frequently suggested in the literature, "[T ] could depend, for example,
on market volatility and other variables.
3. Premises and ags are the same as for \Form-a-Spread", but a \Form-a-Divide" trader
forms a unique reference price acting as a divide between buying and selling (a caution
parameter [T ] 2 [0; 1] is again involved in the calculation):
p

s
[T ] = p

s
[T ] = p

= x
o
+ g
[T ]
(x  x
o
)
p

b
[T ] = p

b
[T ] = minfp

; [T ]m[T ]g
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In the role of seeker, a Take-Action trader will be the party selecting a transaction among the ones made
available by the sampled acceptors. Thus, although he is willing to buy/sell at very extreme prices, he will at
least chose the most convenient price.
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Given the modularity of the computer-implementation of FTR, and the underlying structure of the LSD
platform, turning parameters into variables, and specifying their evolution as a function of other variables and
parameters in the system, is a straightforward exercise (see Berte, 1998, and Valente, 1997 {concerning the LSD
platform).
This can be interpreted as considering the price assessment x
o
+ g
[T ]
(x   x
o
) a reliable
point-evaluation for the close future, and hence using it in the very next transaction: any
price below the divide p

= x
o
+ g
[T ]
(x  x
o
) is seen as a buying opportunity (within the
limits of a share of m[T ]), and any price above the divide as a selling opportunity.
In all cases in which one sets x
o
= x, \Form-a-Divide" is just a special case of \Form-a-
spread", with "[T ] = 0.
Considering some combinations of the two foregoing classications, the following table presents
a rudimentary taxonomy of trader-types.
SOME TRADER-TYPES
Take-Action Form-a-Spread Form-a-Divide
Z
(H)
+ e[T ]
Strong Fund.
Uses (noisy) information on
the current external value.
Always available to buy and
sell (equivalently as seeker
and acceptor). Cautious
about his assessments.
Uses (noisy) information on
the current external value.
Always available to buy and
sell (equivalently as seeker
and acceptor). Condent in
his assessments.
Z
(H 1)
Z
(H 2)
.
.
.
Quasi Fund.
Uses information on the his-
tory of external values. Al-
ways available to buy and
sell (equivalently as seeker
and acceptor). Cautious
about his assessments.
p
(N)
p
(N 1)
.
.
.
Chartist
Uses public information on
prices. Seeking only, with a
very extreme price strategy.
Uses public information on
prices. Always available
to buy and sell (equiva-
lently as seeker and accep-
tor). Cautious about his as-
sessments.
p
(N)
Noise Trader
Uses the price of the last
transaction. Seeking only,
with a very extreme price
strategy.
Uses the price of the last
transaction. Always avail-
able to buy and sell (equiv-
alently as seeker and accep-
tor). Cautious about his as-
sessments.
V (or W )
Sun-spotter
Uses a variable unrelated to
both trade and the \real"
value. Seeking only, with a
very extreme price strategy.
Uses a variable unrelated to
both trade and the \real"
value. Always available
to buy and sell (equiva-
lently as seeker and accep-
tor). Cautious about his as-
sessments.
Uses a variable unrelated to
both trade and the \real"
value. Always available
to buy and sell (equiva-
lently as seeker and accep-
tor). Condent in his as-
sessments.
When implementing a sub-set of this taxonomy, the behavioral state r[T ] has been used for one
classication, and a further indicator (type[T ]) for the other (see Berte, 1998
27
). In particular,
the experiments described in Chiaromonte and Berte (1998) concern a trading room inhabited
by Strong Fundamentalists and Noise Traders forming spreads.
27
The labeling across the taxonomy is slightly dierent.
3.6 Evolution of behaviors
Clearly, even if algorithms in traders' manuals are not changing over time, the range and relative
weight of behavioral and cognitive patterns at the system-level changes as a consequence of birth,
trade (accumulation/decumulation of wealth), and death.
In this sense, FTR as described so far permits the representation of those special cases of evolu-
tionary dynamics driven exclusively by selection, and possibly a form of exogenous introduction
of novelty.
However, as we have already mentioned, one may introduce a dynamics on algorithms in the
manual at the level of each single trader; that is, learning (notice the dierence between this
notion of learning {i.e. evolution of the behavioral and cognitive patterns, and mere cumula-
tion/updating of information while trading
28
).
The way learning can be formalized will obviously depend on the formal framework in which one
chooses to embed the algorithms. When those are parameterized, the most immediate option is
to introduce an updating mechanism on the parameters (parametric learning), but much more
sophisticated options can be devised and implemented, entailing the evolution of the algorithms
themselves.
A possible approach to this is the one adopted in Marengo and Tordjman (1996), and Arthur et
al. (1997). Whichever framework one uses
29
, the general idea is that of endowing a trader with
a whole set of alternative algorithms to perform a given task. Note that those algorithms need
not (although they could) be the ones associated with dierent r[T ]'s; one could have a set of
alternative algorithms within each r[T ]. The trader employs one or the other algorithm based
on scores of their past eectiveness (which, of course, must be dened and measured), while a
random mechanism enlarges the set {mutations, recombinations, etc.
4 The Statistical Oce
Any simulation model, as well as any real world history, produces an overwhelming amount of
data potentially suitable for analysis. One must therefore chose what subset of the data to store
throughout simulation runs, and how to organize them as output. Our metaphor for this is a
statistical oce, which produces statistics about the trading process. It is important to stress
that these statistics are not meant for the traders, although some coincide with information ows
in the room, but for \outside observers" (that is; for users performing simulation experiments).
We distinguished two classes of statistics that might be of interest: Demographic time series,
and Economic time series. Because of the way time is represented in FTR, time series can be
produced on the transaction-scale and/or on the (board clock) minute-scale
30
.
What follows is an illustration of the time series that the statistical oce produces in the current
computer implementation of the model. Obviously, the list is far from exhaustive; any other
statistics of interest ought to be placed here (the statistical oce is the locus for simulation
28
Looking at the board, using the phones, meeting.
29
Strings, graphs, trees, etc.
30
Moreover, because of how the code for FTR is implemented, variables can also be saved on a third scale,
namely, that of transaction rounds (regardless of whether they terminate with the conclusion of a transaction).
See Berte (1998) for more details.
output organization)
31 32
.
Demographic Time Series
On minute-scale No. of births (entries) in H-series
No. of deaths (expulsions) in H-series
No. of traders in the room at the beginning of H-series
The three time series can be reported on one plot, which summarizes the demographic dynamics
through a simulation run
33
.
Economics Time Series
On transaction-scale Price of N -series
No. of traders willing to buy (seek and/or accept) in the round for N -series
No. of traders willing to sell (seek and/or accept) in the round for N -series
No. of traders under size discl. right before N -series
On minute-scale No. of transactions in H-series
No. of bonus-minutes used by traders in H-series
(ave. on trans.'s in each min.) Ave. and st. dev. of the price in H-series
Ave. and st. dev. of the no. of traders willing to buy in H-series
Ave. and st. dev. of the no. of traders willing to sell in H-series
Ave. and st. dev. of the no. of traders under size discl. in H-series
For each of the above, one can plot the average H-series, and a +=  one standard deviation
envelope about it. A single plot might also contain more than one enveloped average H-series;
for example those for the number of traders willing to buy and to sell. Moreover, N -series and
corresponding enveloped average H-series can be superimposed on the same plot.
Besides system-level demographic and economic time series, one might want to produce micro-
data. For example
34
:
Anagraphic Data { For each T
Minute of birth (entrance) Minute of death (expulsion)
This allows one to generate traders' age distributions relative to any minute H .
Also, throughout each trader's life-time (permanence in the room), one can produce
35
Micro Time Series { For each T
On transaction-scale Reference prices in the round for N -series
Cash endowment right before N -series
Asset endowment right before N -series
On min.-scale (ave. on trans.'s in each min.) Ave. reference prices in H-series
Ave. cash endowment in H-series
Ave. asset endowment in H-series
31
Modifying the code to generate any other statistics is very straightforward. Again, see Berte (1998) for more
details.
32
The No. of births (entries) in H-series coincides with the series of n
E(j)
, j = 1; 2; : : : .
33
The No. of transactions in H-series coincides with the system converting sequence 
j
, j = 1; 2; : : : .
34
The Minute of death (expulsion), only if prior to the end of the simulation.
35
\On min.-scale (ave. on trans.'s in each min.)" refers again to overall transactions, and not the ones in which
the trader is involved; recall it is overall transactions counting that denes our time in terms of minutes on the
board clock. Obviously, for any of the average series here, one could produce also the corresponding standard
deviations.
This allows one to study the dynamics of price targeting at the micro level, as well as to follow
shares in cash and asset, on the minute-scale. Moreover, one can generate traders' (average)
size distributions in cash and asset relative to any minute H .
Let us stress once more that the foregoing illustrations must be considered just as instances of
a rich variety of aggregate and micro statistics which FTR can generate.
5 Conclusions
FTR expands upon earlier \articial markets", and attempts to provide a simulation environ-
ment whereby individual behavioral/cognitive patterns and learning processes, architectural and
institutional traits, and time-embedding of events, can be modularly designed and investigated
in terms of emerging dynamic properties of the market {including the fate of operators carrying
particular behavioral and cognitive features.
The structure of FTR, as well as the statistical outputs it can generate, allow for an easy
matching with empirical micro-structural studies of nancial markets. Moreover, in the spirit
of inter-theoretical comparisons {somewhat alike those pioneered by Axelrod and colleagues in
the eld of Game Theory{ FTR permits \tournaments" amongst dierent behavioral micro-
foundations, the assessment of performances by dierent trader types (e.g. in terms of relative
wealth and survival), and the analysis of the statistical properties of dierent \ecologies of
behaviors".
Last but not least, one of the main purposes of FTR is to provide a framework through which
experiments cannot only be designed, but replicated, incrementally built upon one another, and
thus easily compared, by all interested scholars.
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